What actually survives the interconnection queue, and how long it takes
What actually survives the interconnection queue, and how long it takes
Kenneth · 2026-08-09 · Arthur Energy Partners
*Source: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Queued Up 2026 Edition (CC BY 4.0),
complete interconnection request dataset through end-2025. Analysis my own.*
PJM has withdrawn 68% of every interconnection request ever filed. Of 7,666
PJM requests in the dataset: 5,226 withdrawn, 1,192 operational, 1,134 still
active, 114 suspended.
That number is widely quoted. What follows is not.
Of everything that reached a terminal outcome — built or withdrawn:
| Technology | Withdrawn | Built | Failure rate |
|---|---|---|---|
| Offshore wind | 62 | 1 | 98% |
| Solar + battery | 362 | 7 | 98% |
| Battery | 657 | 38 | 95% |
| Solar | 2,565 | 366 | 88% |
| Wind | 499 | 105 | 83% |
| Hydro | 60 | 28 | 68% |
| Gas | 676 | 376 | 64% |
| Coal | 70 | 67 | 51% |
| Oil | 24 | 28 | 46% |
| Nuclear | 24 | 47 | 34% |
**A gas project in PJM is roughly three times likelier to get built than a
battery, and nearly five times likelier than a solar-plus-storage hybrid.**
Offshore wind at 62 withdrawals against a single completion is not a queue
statistic. It is an obituary.
The composite 68% figure conceals a spread from 34% to 98%. Anyone applying the
average to a specific project is mispricing it by a factor of two or three in
either direction.
Of 1,134 PJM requests currently marked active, **447 — 39% — were filed in 2021
or earlier.** Some entered the queue nine years ago.
| Filed | Still active |
|---|---|
| 2025 | 228 |
| 2023 | 156 |
| 2022 | 301 |
| 2021 and earlier | 447 |
Given a median time to operation of 3.2 years, a request filed in 2019 and still
sitting in "active" has already taken twice the median without reaching service.
Counting the active queue as pipeline overstates it by roughly forty per cent.
Across 1,180 completed PJM projects, measured request date to in-service date:
| Fastest 10% | 0.8 years |
| Median | 3.2 years |
| Slowest 10% | 6.8 years |
The gap between the fast decile and the slow decile is six years. That spread,
not the median, is what should drive a financing assumption.
Active PJM requests by state:
| State | Projects | Capacity |
|---|---|---|
| Virginia | 271 | 28.8 GW |
| Illinois | 144 | 21.2 GW |
| Ohio | 162 | 18.2 GW |
| Indiana | 107 | 16.4 GW |
| New Jersey | 66 | 14.5 GW |
| Pennsylvania | 194 | 9.5 GW |
Virginia holds more active capacity than Ohio and Indiana combined — data
centre load, visible in the queue years before it appears anywhere else.
And note Pennsylvania: second by project count, sixth by capacity. **PA's queue is
made of small projects.** Different market, different buyers, and it is invisible
if you look at gigawatts alone.
Withdrawal rate by cohort year — is it worsening, or is the composite figure
dragged down by a decade of dead solar? And whether the Virginia concentration is
new load or repeat filings against the same interconnection points.
Both are answerable from the same dataset. Note 002.
*Method: LBNL's complete request file, filtered to entity = PJM. Failure rate
counts only terminal outcomes, excluding active and suspended requests. Capacity
uses mw_1. Nothing here is modelled or estimated — every figure is a count from
the published data, and the file is free at emp.lbl.gov/queues if you want to
check my arithmetic.*